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1. Introduction
It has been suggested that the world should look to
the Nordic countries in order to build prosperous, well-
governed, and liberal democracies. In this view, the
Nordic combination of a strong state, well-functioning
rule of law, and a responsible democracy is a promis-
ing recipe for good government (Lægreid, 2020, p. 421).
Moreover, political scientists discuss the features of
‘Nordic models’ (Knutsen, 2017, p. 9), while some depict
the Nordic countries as ‘Nordic lights’ showing theway in
times of crisis (Nedergaard &Wivel, 2018, p. 2). Scholars
also ask if and how European integration through the
European Union challenges and changes cooperation be-
tween the Nordic countries (Olsen & Sverdrup, 1998,
pp. 10–12). Furthermore, studies on government agen-
cies cluster the Nordic countries together based on their
geographical location and shared politico-administrative
culture (Verhoest, van Thiel, Bouckaert, & Lægreid, 2012,
p. 10), and these countries are characterized by large
public sectors with small core governments, numerous
large agencies, and large-scale decentralization of tasks
and competencies to the subnational levels of govern-
ments (Verhoest et al., 2012, p. 15). Moreover, the
Nordic countries are relatively small, with informal ad-
ministrative culture, a high level of mutual trust between
political and administrative executives, and extremely
low corruption rates (Balle Hansen, Lægreid, Pierre, &
Salminen, 2012, p. 259; Lægreid, 2018, p. 83; Verhoest
et al., 2012, pp. 15–16).
The focus of this article is Nordic cooperation in the
nuclear safety sector, and this sector may be divided into
three different pillars: safety, safeguards, and security.
Safety is defined as the protection of people, environ-
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ment, and society from the consequences of radiation.
It includes radiation safety and radiation protection con-
cerned with issues like the use of radiation in medicine.
Moreover, safety covers emergency preparedness, and
finally, safety encompasses nuclear safety, which in gen-
eral is about how to operate nuclear facilities to avoid
accidents. Safeguards is about ensuring that nuclear ma-
terial, technology, and information is used for peaceful
purposes, and not to develop nuclear weapons. It thus
includes arms control and non-proliferation. Finally, se-
curity is linked to both safety and safeguards and it is
mainly about protecting nuclear facilities from terrorism,
and how to avoid theft of nuclear material, technology,
and information. The article examines cooperation be-
tween the national authorities on radiation protection
and nuclear safety in the five Nordic countries of Iceland,
Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Finland. A shared char-
acteristic between these authorities is that they are ex-
pert bodies where specialized knowledge is essential,
and the workforce is characterized by highly educated
and skilled experts (Krick & Holst, 2020, p. 2). An im-
portant differentiating feature is that only Sweden and
Finlandhavenuclear power plants. Denmark andNorway
have had nuclear research reactors, while Iceland never
have had nuclear power-generating installations.
The article asks: Why does the degree of integra-
tion vary between issues of safety, security, and safe-
guards, involving the same actors, in the same sector,
at the same level? To account for this variation, the
article studies the effect of institutional and organiza-
tional variables. In so doing, two basic assumptions
emerge: first, history and context matter (Lægreid, 2020,
p. 424; Olsen, 2018). Scholars have emphasized the es-
sential role of history and the problems of universal,
non-contextual explanations by not analysing the con-
ditions under which organizational factors are likely to
have explanatory power. As different public administra-
tions are located differently in time and space, the ques-
tion is how the past affects the future and how pub-
lic administrations learn—or not—from experience and
changing environments (Olsen, 2018). Secondly, organi-
zation matters (Olsen, 2018). It has been argued that or-
ganization theory is a powerful instrument for approach-
ing public governance as organizational factors are ex-
pected to create biases in governance processes, mak-
ing some choices more likely than others (Egeberg &
Trondal, 2018, pp. 1–4; Lægreid, 2020, p. 422). The article
therefore contributes to the organization theory-based
institutional approach in public administration research
(Lægreid, 2020, p. 421) by emphasising that public bu-
reaucracies are more than instruments in the hands of
national governments. They are also partly autonomous
institutions that do not adapt in a simple and straightfor-
ward way to new steering signals or to changing environ-
mental pressure (Lægreid, 2020, p. 423).
Furthermore, the phenomenon of inter-administrat-
ive coordination has been predominantly studied with
a focus on their proliferation and effectiveness in pro-
moting common principles, rules, and best practices
(Keohane & Nye, 1974; Slaughter, 2004). Studying the
cooperation between the Nordic authorities in the nu-
clear safety sector adds to this literature by unpacking
the cooperation itself. The study also reflects discussions
on differentiated integration (Gänzle, Leruth, & Trondal,
2020) and shows that Nordic cooperation in the nuclear
safety sector best can be described as differentiated be-
tween the highly integrated safety areas of radiation pro-
tection and emergency preparedness, and the less inte-
grated areas of nuclear safety, security, and safeguards.
Finally, the article demonstrates how national authori-
ties collaborate in a sector where parts of the portfolio
are ‘core state powers.’ Core state powers are defined by
their “institutional significance for state-building,” which
include foreign and defence policy, public finances, pub-
lic administration, and the maintenance of law and or-
der (Genschel & Jachtenfuchs, 2014, p. 1). The implica-
tion is twofold: First, the case facilitates an opportunity
to study the effect of non-core and core state portfo-
lios on cooperation within the same sector; secondly,
portfolios of core state powers are a hard case where
highly integrated cooperation is less likely. The national
authorities in the Nordic countries have portfolios reach-
ing from non-core issues—like radiation protection—to
core state issues, such as nuclear security. The study
finds that the differentiated cooperation between the
Nordic authorities in the nuclear safety sector mirrors
the division between non-core portfolios and core-state
portfolios. Hence, the data indicates the importance of
path dependency as well as portfolio where integrated
cooperation is more challenging to establish and main-
tain in core-state portfolios.
The article proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines the
theoretical framework in two steps: First, integration is
defined and operationalized, and secondly, independent
variables that might account for variation are outlined.
Sections 3 and 4 briefly introduce the method and data,
and present the empirical findings. Section 5 summarizes
key findings and contributions to the literature.
2. Theoretical Framework
This article focuses on the organization theory-based in-
stitutional approach to public administration. In orga-
nization theory, integration is understood as the coor-
dination between two or more actors and how they
adapt collaboratively to solve a problem or provide a
service (Jacobsen, 2017, p.198). Coordination is thus pic-
tured as the purposeful alignment of tasks and efforts to
achieve a defined goal (Lægreid&Rykkja, 2015; Verhoest
& Bouckaert, 2005, p. 95). The term coordination also
implies the use of mechanisms that more tightly and
formally link together different units (Keast & Mandell,
2014). Through coordinationmechanisms—and thus the
integration of units—synergies are created, enabling
organizations to become more efficient and effective
(Jacobsen, 2017, p. 197). National agencies, as public en-
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tities, are expected to create optimal value for citizens,
and cooperation between agencies is thus a means to in-
crease value. Consequently, cross-territorial cooperation
between functionally similar agencies is mainly about
how these agencies manage to pool and exploit com-
mon resources across territories (Jacobsen, 2017, p. 204).
In literature on inter-organizational relations, coordina-
tion is defined as a behavioral process with focus on in-
teractions and relations between actors. This approach
also concentrates on how the interaction is organized,
and the aim is to highlight explanations for coordinative
behaviour both by looking at characteristics of the ac-
tors involved and the characteristics of how the coordi-
nation between organizations is organized or structured
(Jacobsen, 2017, p. 200).
The degree of integration between the authorities is
operationalized by looking at four coordination mecha-
nisms focused on both behaviour and organizational di-
mensions (see Table 1). First, the most used operational-
ization of coordination appears to be the type and in-
tensity of interaction between actors (Jacobsen, 2017,
p. 210; Keast & Mandell, 2014). This article thus con-
centrates on contact patterns and communication flows,
where regular contact and communication indicate a
high degree of integration. Secondly, the existence of
reciprocal trust will most likely have a substantial im-
pact on coordination, where trustmakes communication
flow easier, reduces costs associated with monitoring
other actors in the cooperation, and dampens conflict
between participants (Jacobsen, 2017, p. 211). Thirdly,
high levels of integration are recognized by the degree
of formalization in the cooperation. The existence of per-
manent structures where the actors involved can meet
to coordinate activities through direct communication
indicates high degrees of integration (Jacobsen, 2017,
p. 207; Keast &Mandell, 2014). Finally, the pooling of re-
sources imply that tasks and different types of resources
are ‘moved out’ of the original organizations, suggesting
higher degrees of integration (Jacobsen, 2017, p. 208).
In addition, this article includes the perceived impor-
tance of the cooperation as an indicator of the level
of integration.
The degree of integration in the cooperation be-
tween theNordic authorities on radiation protection and
nuclear safety is analyzed on a continuum reaching from
a low degree of integration to a high degree of integra-
tion (see Table 1).
To account for variation on the degree of integration,
the article studies the effect of historical institutional-
ism and organization structure. While the degree of in-
tegration is not simply conditioned by these factors, the
aim is to show that historical institutionalism and orga-
nizational structure adds to the understanding of which
factors influence integration in cooperation between na-
tional agencies at a higher level, such as the Nordic one.
The article discusses the effect of path-dependency, size,
horizontal specialization, and vertical specialization on in-
tegration, by both studying properties of the Nordic co-
operation itself, and also by looking at characteristics of
each individual authority in the Nordic countries.
Historical institutionalism is based on the basic as-
sumptions that history matters, and that history is not a
chain of independent incidents (Steinmo, 2008). The fo-
cus is thus on the construction, maintenance, and adap-
tation of institutions (Sanders, 2006, p. 42), emphasizing
the origin and evolution of the rules, norms, and prac-
tices shaping policy outcomes and the structure of poli-
ties (Fioretos, Falleti, & Sheingate, 2016). The concep-
tual toolbox related to historical institutionalism consists
of concepts like path dependence and critical junctures
(Fioretos et al., 2016).
In this study, path dependency is understood as “dy-
namic processes involving positive feedback” (Fioretos
et al., 2016) overlapping with the idea of ‘increasing re-
turns’ (Pierson, 2000). These ideas capture a basic ele-
ment in understanding path-dependency displaying how
the costs of changing from one alternative to another
will increase over time creating a self-reinforcement dy-
namic, making deviation from an existing path increas-
ingly more difficult (Fioretos et al., 2016; Pierson, 2000).
Path-dependent processes are born through critical junc-
tures, understood as “a period of significant change,
which typically occurs in distinct ways in different coun-
tries (or in other units of analysis) and which is hypothe-
sized to produce distinct legacies” (Collier & Collier, 2002,
p. 29). Thus, path dependency shows how particular his-
torical junctures have lasting consequences. However,
path dependent arguments based on positive feedback
propose that not only ‘big’ events havebig consequences.
Small ones, that happen at the right time, can have
vast consequences as well (Pierson, 2000). Furthermore,
literature on institutional change suggests that path-
dependent lock-in is a rare phenomenon, opening the
possibility that institutions normally evolve in incremen-
Table 1. Operationalization of integration.
Proxy Low degree of integration High degree of integration
Contact pattern Infrequent communications flows Regular communications flows
Trust Low reciprocal trust High reciprocal trust
Formalization None or ad hoc Permanent structures
Resources Resources remain in each authority Pooled resources
Perceived importance * Low High
Note: * Of the cooperation. Source: Based on Jacobsen (2017) and Keast and Mandell (2014).
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tal ways (Thelen & Mahoney, 2010, p. 3). In relation
to Nordic cooperation in general, Olsen and Sverdrup
(1998, p. 26) suggested that longstanding Nordic net-
works, grounded in professions and located in the state
administration, may prove to be more robust toward ex-
ternal changes than Nordic cooperation which lack these
characteristics. In broad terms, robustness refers to a
complex system’s ability to remain functional and sta-
ble despite uncertainty, and also to the system’s capac-
ity to withstand and survive external shocks (Bankes,
2010; Capano & Woo, 2017). Moreover, in organization
theory, robustness refers to an organization’s capacity
to retain its core characteristics under evolving circum-
stances (van Oss & van ‘t Hek, 2011, p. 4). Though
discussed, robustness is often associated with the con-
cept of resilience (Capano & Woo, 2017; Walker, Holling,
Carpenter, & Kinzig, 2004), and both concepts may func-
tion as frameworks for understanding how complex sys-
tems self-organize and change over time (Anderies, Folke,
Walker, & Ostrom, 2013). Regarding path dependency,
proposition one (#1) is that Nordic cooperation will be
more integrated if the cooperation has been successful in
achieving its goals leading to positive feedbacks and self-
reinforcing dynamics. Moreover, integrated cooperation
is more likely if there is a longstanding history where criti-
cal junctures have strengthened the cooperation. Finally,
integration increases if the cooperation has showed ro-
bustness toward external changes and shocks. The expec-
tation is therefore that Nordic cooperation in this sector
will be more integrated on issues of radiation protection,
rather than on nuclear safety, security, and safeguards.
An organization structure is a normative structure
consisting of rules and norms specifying, more or less
clearly, who is expected to do what and how (Egeberg
& Trondal, 2018, p. 5). Different dimensions of the orga-
nizational structure enable varied insights into how struc-
ture affects individual behaviour (Egeberg & Trondal,
2018, pp. 6–7). The following outlines three struc-
tural variables: size, horizontal specialization, and verti-
cal specialization:
• The size of an organization indicates the capac-
ity to initiate policies, develop alternatives, imple-
ment decisions, and monitor compliance (Egeberg
& Trondal, 2018, p. 7). Large organizations, in
terms of staff size, are therefore less dependent
on other actors or organizations to carry out its
task, and thus they are more autonomous than
smaller organizations. Consequently, small orga-
nizations must, to a greater degree than their
larger counterparts, build capacity through other
means, like cooperation, using the potential bene-
fits of economies of scale (Jacobsen, 2017, p. 203).
Proposition two (#2) is thus that large authorities
in this sector, like those in Sweden and Finland,
will be less integrated into the Nordic cooperation
than the smaller authorities in Denmark, Norway,
and Iceland.
• Horizontal specialization shows how different pol-
icy areas and issues are supposed to be linked to-
gether or de-coupled from each other (Egeberg &
Trondal, 2018, p. 8). Moreover, horizontal special-
ization influences the division of portfolios in orga-
nizations. In the case of the Nordic authorities on
radiation protection and nuclear safety, their over-
all portfolio may be viewed through two different
lenses. The first lens divides the portfolio into core
state and non-core portfolios. Core state powers
portfolios are connected to foreign and defence
policy and include issues like nuclear security and
safeguards. The other lens divides the portfolios
into the three pillars of safety, security, and safe-
guards. Two propositions follow: First, the expec-
tation is that there will be both less cooperation
and integration between the Nordic authorities on
core state portfolios because these policy areas
will be more closely tied to the national govern-
ment and parent ministries (#3). Secondly, the ex-
pectation is that cooperation between the author-
ities will follow departmental lines, where units
with shared sector affiliation will collaborate (#4).
Hence, different parts of the national authorities
will be involved in Nordic cooperation to different
degrees and extent, and the cooperation between
the Nordic authorities will therefore be character-
ized by differentiated integration.
• Vertical specialization refers to the division of
labour between different hierarchical levels within
or between organizations. Studies show that inter-
organizational specialization leads to agency offi-
cials paying significantly less attention to signals
from executive politicians than their counterparts
in the ministries, creating more leeway for expert-
based decision-making (Egeberg & Trondal, 2018,
pp. 10, 86; Holst & Gornitzka, 2015). Hence, ver-
tical specialization favours agency autonomy vis-à-
vis the national government and parent ministries,
creating leeway for expert-concerns rather than
national, political concerns. Proposition five (#5)
is thus that organizations, which are de-coupled
from the parent ministry, will be more likely
to engage in Nordic cooperation than organiza-
tions structured as part of the parent ministry or
other overarching organizations, like the authori-
ties in Denmark.
3. Data and Method
To unpack the cooperation between the Nordic au-
thorities in the nuclear safety sector, this study bene-
fits from an original dataset based on a qualitative re-
searchmethod.Qualitativemethods encompass rich and
detailed data which may provide deep understanding.
Moreover, interviews open a window into the percep-
tions of interviewees, their experiences, and underly-
ing processes, enabling a better understanding of com-
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plex social realities (Buchana, Garbutt, & Seymour, 2018;
Smith & Elger, 2014, p. 119). The interview data con-
sists of 37 semi-structured expert interviews with of-
ficials from all of the national authorities on radia-
tion protection and nuclear safety in the Nordic coun-
tries, conducted in 2018 and 2019. 22 interviews were
conducted at the Norwegian Radiation and Nuclear
Safety Authority (DSA), with the remaining 15 interviews
from the authorities in Iceland, Denmark, Sweden, and
Finland. All interviewees are highly educated and skilled
professionals, and the data include interviews with of-
ficials from the management level of all the authori-
ties. Staff working on communication and administra-
tion have not been included. The interviewees were se-
lected based on their strategic position and widespread
knowledge of the functioning of the authorities, and key
contacts in the authorities also contributed to recruit-
ing new interviewees. The interview questions targeted
aspects of employment, internal and external contact
patterns, relationship with the parent ministry, role per-
ceptions, and experiences with international coopera-
tion at different levels. All 37 interviews are important
for the findings presented, although primarily presented
at an aggregated level. Most interviews were conducted
face-to-face, except five interviews conducted via Skype
and Lifesize. The interviews were taped and transcribed.
To preserve their anonymity, each interviewee was as-
signed an interview code. The datawas collected in accor-
dance with the requirements of the Norwegian Centre
for Research Data.
4. Empirical Findings
It is not possible to narrow the cooperation between the
Nordic authorities in the nuclear safety sector down to
one singular cooperation. Instead, the cooperation fol-
lows the division between the threemain pillars of safety,
security, and safeguards. The data shows that there are
important differences in how the national authorities in-
teract within these different pillars, and there is a con-
tinuum ranging from safety issues, like radiation protec-
tion and emergency preparedness, where the coopera-
tion is characterized by high integration, whereas in se-
curity and safeguards issues, cooperation is marked by
low integration.
The cooperation on safety can be divided into four
different parts: cooperation on radiation protection,
emergency preparedness, the Nordic Nuclear Safety
Research (NKS), and cooperation on nuclear safety. The
cooperation on radiation protection and emergency pre-
paredness is mainly organized around the Nordic chiefs
meeting. Once every year the directors of the Nordic au-
thorities gather, and they have several working groups
that report to the chiefs meeting. The NKS, mainly
funded by the Nordic authorities, is a platform for Nordic
research on nuclear safety that includes emergency
preparedness. Direct cooperation on nuclear safety is
most evident between the Swedish Radiation Safety
Authority (SSM) and the Radiation and Nuclear Safety
Authority (STUK) in Finland. However, there is not a gen-
eral Nordic cooperation in this area comparable to the
one on radiation protection and emergency prepared-
ness. Moreover, the SSM and the STUK have a confiden-
tiality agreement which allows them to discuss some se-
curity issues. This may indicate that the cooperation be-
tween the Swedish and Finish authorities within the nu-
clear safety sector is more integrated than the overall
Nordic cooperation.
The Nordic chiefs meeting and the working groups
on radiation protection and emergency preparedness
is the most integrated cooperation between all the
Nordic authorities. It is characterized by high levels of
trust, continuous communication flows, some attempts
to pool resources, joint projects, and permanent struc-
tures through the working groups and the annual chiefs
meeting. It is also perceived as important by the intervie-
wees. A prominent example is the NordicWorking Group
of Emergency Preparedness (NEP):
We have a great Nordic cooperation with sister agen-
cies in the other countries. We meet twice a year, all
of us working on emergency preparedness in these
countries. And we can have joint publications, joint
working groups, joint exercises, seminars, and work-
shops, so it is very important for us to have this Nordic
network. And of course, we cooperate with many oth-
ers as well, but I would probably say that the most
important sphere is the Nordic cooperation, because
that is where the nearest nuclear facilities are located.
That is one part of it, but it is also important to have
joint Nordic recommendations, for example. So, we
know each other well! (Interviewee 36)
Furthermore, interviewees underscore the importance
of building strong relationships, with a foundation of
trust and shared knowledge, to gain joint understand-
ings of practices in the other countries. Another critical
element to the cooperation is the need for colleagues,
which is scarce at the national level, and interviewees ex-
plain why cooperation is important as follows:
The reason why this is important to us, is that the
professional communities are small, and there are
very few people working on every single issue—
sometimes just one person. So, it’s very vulnerable,
and to have colleagues, you must go outside your
country. So, I guess that’s what I’m passionate about:
professional cooperation. (Interviewee 21)
Finally, attempts to pool resources and benefit mutually
within the field of radiation protection are described in
this way:
We are small countries with limited resources, so we
don’t need to do the same things in all the five coun-
tries. That’s a very good output of the Nordic groups—
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it is better to cooperate, compared to everyone doing
the same things by themselves. (Interviewee 2)
The modern awareness of ionizing radiation started in
the late 1800s with the discovery of X-rays and radioac-
tive uranium, giving rise to medical radiation. In the
1930s scientists achieved nuclear fission, which led to
the construction of nuclear reactors and the atomic
bomb. Indeed, the scope of both the dangers and pos-
sibilities of nuclear energy peaked during the Second
World War, giving birth to cooperation targeted to en-
courage and facilitate safe and peaceful use of nuclear
energy like the establishment of the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1957. The Nordic countries were
also interested in peaceful use of nuclear energy and
Norway, Sweden, andDenmark proved to be forerunners
by building research reactors during the 1950s, while
Finland had their first research reactor operating from
1962. However, only Sweden and Finland decided to con-
struct nuclear reactors for energy production, first put
into operation during the 1960s and the 1970s. Today,
all the research reactors have been, or are in the process
of being, decommissioned. Only reactors for energy pro-
duction in Sweden and Finland continue to operate in the
Nordic countries.
Regarding the historical roots of the Nordic coopera-
tion within the nuclear safety sector, the events of the
Second World War prompted the Nordic countries to
have their own nuclear meetings from 1949. Eventually,
this led to two parallel tracks of Nordic cooperation
within this field. The first track originated in 1957 with
an initiative of the Nordic Council of Ministers (NCM) to
establish a permanent committee on questions related
to nuclear energy: the Nordisk kontaktorgan for atomen-
ergispørsmål (NKA). The Suez Crisis in 1956 underscored
Europe’s dependence on imported oil and the NKA was
to oversee planning and activities in the field of atomic
energy and encourage mutual assistance in case of nu-
clear accidents. The NKA was made up of officials from
the ministries of energy, industry, and foreign affairs, ac-
companied by experts. Economic growth in the Nordics
during the late 1960s increased the demand for electric-
ity, making questions of nuclear power highly relevant.
The NKA formed new groups to address such questions,
and while the NKA grew, the organization increasingly
became more complex and less transparent. The 1970s
and 1980s brought growing concerns for the environ-
ment, pollution, and modern technology, exemplified by
The Limits to Growth report from 1972. Simultaneously,
the opposition against nuclear power grew in the Nordic
countries sparked by incidents like the Three Mile Island
accident in 1979. Moreover, the NKA was increasingly
viewed as a controversial political actor functioning as ‘a
state in the state’ promoting nuclear power, and eventu-
ally theNKAwas dissolved after the Chernobyl disaster in
1986. However, the research branch of the NKA, the NKS,
survived and the NKS is still an important part of Nordic
cooperation in the nuclear safety sector.
The other track of cooperation gained importance
in 1959 when the NCM recommended cooperation be-
tween the Nordic radiation protection authorities. The
initiative encouraged regular expert meetings starting in
1961 and an agreement on early warning in case of an ac-
cident. While Iceland was not part of this agreement in
the beginning, they joined in 1965. Initially, the cooper-
ation addressed questions related to radioactive fallout,
whichwas amajor concern in theNordic countries due to
the culmination of nuclear bomb tests during the 1950s.
The result was a joint Nordic statement on the matter
and cooperation expanded and further evolved through
the development of the Nordic Flag Books, dealing with
international recommendations on radiation protection
adapted to Nordic conditions. The first flag book from
1976 marked a significant contribution toward a com-
mon Nordic view on radiation protection. From the be-
ginning, the Nordic countries had separate authorities
for radiation protection and nuclear safety, and these au-
thorities only interacted sporadically. However, the first
directors meeting with representatives from both the ra-
diation protection authorities and nuclear safety author-
ities was held in 1977, establishing the chiefs meeting
with its working groups. In contrast to the cooperation
through the NKA, the cooperation between the author-
ities strengthened after Chernobyl and led to the estab-
lishment of the NEP. Furthermore, the cooperation with-
stood the Fukushima accident in 2011, and the develop-
ment of the newest flag book from 2014 shows that the
cooperation between the Nordic Authorities continues
to be important and influential:
The cooperation between the authorities was smooth
and unconstrained by political influence, while the
NKA was approaching the end. The authorities were
praised for their handling of the impact of the
Chernobyl accident, and the cooperation between
the authorities continues to be very useful to this day.
(Interviewee 5)
In the years after the Second World War, there was no
established European cooperation between national au-
thorities in the nuclear safety sector. However, in 1999,
the Western European Nuclear Regulators Association
(WENRA) was established, and in 2007 the Heads
of the European Radiological Protection Competent
Authorities (HERCA) was created. TheWENRA deals with
questions related to nuclear power plants and mainly
nuclear safety issues, while The HERCA revolves around
radiation protection. The data suggests the importance
of both organizations, however in distinct ways. On ar-
eas where there is no established Nordic cooperation,
like nuclear safety, cooperation in other arenas will be
increasingly important for the authorities. Thus, on is-
sues of nuclear safety, cooperation through the WENRA
is highly important as the only organization of its kind
in Europe:
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I think to some extent it has happened on nuclear
safety, where we don’t have that much cooperation
in the Nordic countries as we have on radiation safety.
And the reason is that on the nuclear safety area, we
have WENRA for instance. So, we already work to-
gether very effectively and efficiently, and the goals
of WENRA are aligned with our goals and the Nordic
countries goals, so we don’t need to have a spe-
cific cooperation forum within the Nordic countries.
(Interviewee 1)
Regarding radiation protection, the Nordic cooperation
was established and successful long before the HERCA
was founded, and the data suggests that cooperation
through the HERCA has not diminished cooperation
through the chiefs meeting. The data also indicates that
the Nordic authorities use the established Nordic coop-
eration to coordinate opinions and Nordic statements
to gain leverage at the international level. Thus, Nordic
cooperation on radiation protection also serves as a re-
source and coordination platform toward other organiza-
tions where the Nordic authorities are present:
One thing is to make our work more influential and
more effective nationally, but at the international
level, when we participate in certain international
meetings, we first discuss within the Nordic countries.
Then we might find that we all agree, and then we
have more leverage to put forward certain opinions
that we share. Usually we share most of the opinions,
so it is quite easy to work within the Nordic coun-
tries. So, I think that at least these two points are very
important in the Nordic cooperation: We have more
leverage at the international level, and we can work
more efficiently at the national level if we combine all
our resources. (Interviewee 2)
The brief historical outline above suggests that the coop-
eration between the Nordic authorities on radiation pro-
tection succeeded in contributing to the development
of radiation protection in the Nordic countries and also
internationally by developing a common Nordic under-
standing manifested through joint statements and the
flag books. The data thus suggests that the combination
of longstanding roots and success in achieving its goals
are important for explaining the highly integrated coop-
eration on radiation protection. As one interviewee put
it: “The Nordic cooperation has been around for a long
time, and it has been very influential. So, many interna-
tional practices came from the Nordic groups originally,
and there are several active groups on different areas”
(Interviewee 2). Moreover, important critical junctures,
like Chernobyl, strengthened the cooperation and it dis-
played robustness in its capacity to withstand and sur-
vive external shocks. The data indicates that Nordic co-
operation on radiation protection also displays robust-
ness toward changes in the organizational environment,
where the cooperation upholds its important role de-
spite new actors like the HERCA. Thus, the historical con-
text of the cooperationmakes it plausible to assume that
self-reinforcement dynamics are in place, making devia-
tion from the existing path and pattern of cooperation
less likely.
Regarding Nordic cooperation through the NKA, his-
tory shows that cooperation on issues more directly re-
lated to nuclear power plants—like questions of nuclear
energy, nuclear safety, and nuclear security—are more
politically contested and thus more difficult to maintain
over time at the Nordic level. The cooperation through
the NKA was also driven by officials from the ministries,
while the experts from the authorities played a minor
role. The data thus indicates that the proximity to the
political level may have made cooperation more turbu-
lent. Furthermore, a series of small and large critical junc-
tures and incremental evolvements of the organization—
like the growing skepticism to nuclear power, the declin-
ing transparency of the NKA, and the Three Mile Island
accident—created an environment where, eventually,
the NKA was not able to withstand the external shock
of the Chernobyl accident. After the dissolvement of the
NKA, other actors like the WENRA have gained influence
in the field of nuclear safety, and the data suggests that
path dependent mechanisms makes Nordic cooperation
on nuclear safety comparable to the one on radiation
protection, redundant. Thus, by studying Nordic cooper-
ation in the nuclear safety sector after the SecondWorld
War, proposition one (#1) holds. It shows the relevance
of path dependency through positive feedback and criti-
cal junctures for understanding why cooperation on radi-
ation protection and emergency preparedness is highly
integrated at the Nordic level, compared to cooperation
on issues of nuclear safety, security, and safeguards.
Considering the size variable, the Nordic authorities
differ considerably in terms of how many employees
the organizations have (see Table 2). The main propo-
sition regarding size is that the largest organizations in-
tegrate into Nordic cooperation to a lesser degree than
smaller structures. However, considering the most inte-
grated part of the Nordic cooperation—cooperation on
radiation protection and emergency preparedness—the
Table 2. Number of employees in the national authorities.
Iceland Denmark Norway Sweden Finland
Employees 10 13 * 120 300 333
40 **
Notes: * The Nuclear Department, ** The Radiation Protection Unit (SIS).
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data shows that all the authorities are equally commit-
ted, and they all perceive the cooperation to be impor-
tant for their own organization:
I would say that the Nordic cooperation is extremely
important! First of all, international cooperation is
very important. For a small expert organization, it is re-
ally the onlyway inwhich you can secure andmaintain
competence for the staff. It is easy to get stuck when
you are in a small country and you are the only organi-
zation dealing with something. So international coop-
eration is extremely important. But to me, the most
important cooperation internationally is the Nordic
cooperation. I consider the Nordic cooperation to be
extremely important, and I think it is quite clear that
the Nordic cooperation has improved radiation safety
in the Nordic countries. (Interviewee 5)
A possible explanation is that both the Swedish and
the Finnish interviewees describe their organizations as
small and with limited resources. Thus, since small or-
ganizations need to build capacity through cooperation
to be able to carry out their tasks, the proposition holds
(#2). The size of an organization also indicates degrees of
autonomy and the capacity to initiate policies, develop
alternatives, implement decisions, and monitor compli-
ance (Egeberg & Trondal, 2018, p. 7). The data suggests
that the largest authority, the Finnish STUK, has a more
active and pronounced agenda toward influencing other
actors, also at the international level:
I would say that the Finns are the very best. Exactly
what their strategy is, I wouldn’t know, but I do know
that if you look at the international context, you will
almost always find a very skilled and talented Finn in
different arenas, and it is quite typical that they are
very accomplished within our field. (Interviewee 6)
Regarding the horizontal specialization of the Nordic au-
thorities, the data indicates that there is less coopera-
tion and integration between the Nordic authorities on
the core-state portfolios of security and safeguards com-
pared to the non-core portfolio of radiation protection.
One possible explanation is that the foundation for such
cooperation is lacking since these questions aremore rel-
evant in countries with nuclear power plants. However,
the data suggests that the lack of cooperation is first and
foremost related to the characteristics of security and
safeguards issues. Security issues are marked by secrecy,
and except some interaction between the SSM and the
STUK, cooperation is scarce: “These security people are
very strict, and sometimes they don’t want to discuss,
and because of these sensitive issues, they cannot re-
ally share information like in the safety area. You cannot
compare their practices” (Interviewee 3). And: “Security
is different. You can’t talk about it because it’s confiden-
tial, and that’s why it’s more difficult in the international
forums” (Interviewee 1). The same follows for issues re-
lated to safeguards,which in general are described as ‘po-
litical,’ where themain cooperation is channeled through
the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and the IAEA. The data
thus shows few signs of joint Nordic cooperation within
both the areas of security and safeguards:
Safeguards are more political. There is much more
political influence also at the technical level in this
area. There is North Korea and Iran and India.
Pakistan, Israel….So, it easily becomes kind of high-
level political discussions even at the technical level.
(Interviewee 4)
Consequently, different parts of the authorities will be in-
tegrated into a Nordic cooperation to different degrees,
where units and personnel working on issues related to
security and safeguards will be least integrated. The data
thus supports both propositions related to the horizontal
specialization of theNordic authoritieswhere, first, there
is less cooperation on core-state portfolios (#3), and
secondly, the cooperation follows departmental lines,
where units with shared sector affiliation tend to cooper-
ate (#4). This leads to quite different patterns of cooper-
ation and explains why there is not just one Nordic coop-
erationwithin the nuclear safety sector and between the
national authorities. Rather, there are different arenas
for cooperation which differ in their degree of integra-
tion. Furthermore, the data suggests that the difference
in degree of integration partly is caused by the charac-
teristics of core-state portfolios and non-core portfolios,
where cooperation on core-state portfolios is more chal-
lenging to establish and maintain.
Furthermore, the five Nordic authorities differ in re-
gard to both the vertical and the horizontal specialization,
and the structure in Denmark stands out compared to
the other four authorities. Horizontally, Iceland, Norway,
Sweden, and Finland each have one agencyworking on is-
sues of both safety, security, and safeguards. In Denmark,
however, these policy areas are divided into two dif-
ferent units where the SIS mainly deals with issues of
radiation protection, while the Nuclear Department fo-
cuses their work on issues of nuclear safety, security,
safeguards, and emergency preparedness. Vertically, the
SIS and the Danish Nuclear Department are not inde-
pendent agencies, but the SIS is a department in the
Danish Health Authority, while the Nuclear Department
is part of the Danish Emergency Management Agency.
Hence, the portfolio of the nuclear safety sector is di-
vided between two units which serve as departments
in two different agencies subordinated to different min-
istries. The other four Nordic authorities are indepen-
dent agencies formally subordinated to one ministry, ex-
cept the DSA which is formally subordinated to three dif-
ferent ministries. Considering the integrated Nordic co-
operation on radiation protection and emergency pre-
paredness, the data suggests that all the national agen-
cies and the two departments in Denmark are equally in-
volved. One explanation is that the interviewees experi-
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ence autonomy toward parent ministries and overarch-
ing agencies based on their specific knowledge and ex-
pertise: “Historically speaking,we are the experts andwe
have the necessary knowledge which the ministry basi-
cally lacks” (Interviewee 10). Also:
People have their own tasks and it’s quite individual
what you areworking on. I have projects and activities
Imanagemyself, and professionally speaking, I am the
expert within my field, so, there is nobody else who
has much to object or to say. (Interviewee 30)
Thus, the findings show that the authorities perceive con-
tact with epistemic communities and experts as funda-
mental for the functioning of the organization:
It’s important to have the international focus. So,
if we turn it around: How would we manage if we
didn’t work internationally? It wouldn’t have worked
at all!….Remember, it is a small area of expertise. So,
we who work within DSA would need to have very
good justifications if we were to regulate radioactiv-
ity, radiation, and emissions in a completely different
way than our international partners. (Interviewee 23)
But a great deal of the input we get on things that
are important to us often originates from interna-
tional arenas: international conferences and organiza-
tions. We take home what is necessary, and these in-
puts provide important premises for our further work.
(Interviewee 24)
Hence, the data indicates both leeway for expert con-
cerns and the importance of cooperation between ex-
pert bodies. The data therefore shows few signs of dif-
ferences in the engagement within Nordic cooperation
due to differences in the vertical specialization between
different authorities (#5).
5. Conclusion and Outlook
This study finds that the cooperation between theNordic
authorities in the nuclear safety sector is differentiated
between the highly integrated areas of radiation protec-
tion and emergency preparedness, whereas the areas
of nuclear security and safeguards is marked by low de-
grees of integration. To understand this variation, the ar-
ticle unpacks the cooperation itself by asking why these
differences occur within the same sector and between
the same actors. The findings suggest the importance
of path dependency by highlighting two different path
dependent mechanisms. First, positive feedback makes
deviation from existing paths less likely, and secondly,
critical junctures display the robustness of the coopera-
tion when confronted with external shocks and changes.
Thus, the longstanding history and success of the Nordic
cooperation on radiation protection and emergency pre-
paredness contributes to explaining why this coopera-
tion upholds its importance. It also confirms Olsen and
Sverdrup’s (1998, p. 26) suggestion that longstanding
Nordic networks, grounded in professions and located
in the state administration, may be more robust toward
external changes than Nordic cooperation, which lacks
these characteristics. The findings also correspond to the
division between non-core portfolios and core-state port-
folios, where integrated cooperation on core-state port-
folios aremore difficult to establish andmaintain than co-
operation on non-core portfolios. Cooperation on core-
state portfolios is a hard case and the findings in this
study confirm this notion.
The study reflects organizational-institutional ap-
proaches to political science by suggesting that gover-
nance systems and practices under stress may revert
to or strengthen established organizational traditions,
practices, and formats, reinforcing institutional path-
dependencies (Gänzle et al., 2020, p. 15). Thus, crises
may produce critical junctures that generate ‘windows
of opportunity’ for more integrated cooperation. The
study shows under which conditions crisis and external
shocks might lead to either more integrated cooperation
or its breakdown. Furthermore, the study adds to the
organization theory-based institutional approach in pub-
lic administration research highlighting how national ex-
pert authorities, placed in the state administration, are
partly autonomous institutions where a great deal of
what is important originates from epistemic communi-
ties. Moreover, the findings offer insight into how cross-
territorial cooperation between functionally similar au-
thorities at the same level function and evolve over time,
highlighting how they manage to pool and exploit com-
mon resources across territories. Finally, this study con-
tributes to the study of differentiated integration (Gänzle
et al., 2020) by showing how national authorities and
agencies act as incoherent wholes where patterns of
cooperation and degrees of integration vary within the
same authority.
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